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In this paper we study the law and economics of the EU data breach notification obligation 
(EU DBNO), which is part of the general data protection regulation. We start our discus- 
sion with the origins and aims of the EU DBNO. Following this, we study the social benefits 
of the DBNO and the conditions for these social benefits to emerge. Next, we analyse 
whether there would be spontaneous notification without the existence of a DBNO. We dis- 
cuss how the national DPAs, that are responsible for the execution of the EU DBNO, can suf- 
ficiently induce data controllers to comply with the regulation. We also discuss the scope of 
the regulation from a social welfare perspective, in particular the conditions, which trigger 
a notification from data controllers. 
© 2018 Bernold Nieuwesteeg and Michael Faure. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights 
reserved. 
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. Introduction 
n November 7, 2016 the Erasmus University Rotterdam ex- 
erienced a large data breach affecting 17,000 individuals.1 
he data breach was notified to the Dutch Data Protection 
gency (DPA) and to the individuals affected.2 We were also 
ffected and notified and experienced the practical effects 
f data breach disclosure. This paper will perform a law and w
a
∗ Corresponding author: Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burgemeeste
E-mail address: nieuwesteeg@law.eur.nl (B. Nieuwesteeg). 
1 See JP Buntinx, ‘Erasmus University Data Breach Exposes Students’ M
ttps://themerkle.com/erasmus-university-data- 
reach- exposes- students- medical- and- financial- information/ accesse
2 The Dutch Data Protection Authority is called the Autoriteit Persoo
ay 2018. 
3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with re
f such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1. 
4 Those breaches of personal data can be both analogue and dig
ithin a digital infrastructure, because the majority of personal d
aper we will primarily focus on personal data breaches in the digital s
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2018.05.026 
267-3649/© 2018 Bernold Nieuwesteeg and Michael Faure. Published bconomics analysis on the European Union data breach noti- 
cation obligation (Hereafter ‘EU DBNO’ or ‘the DBNO’) as in- 
orporated in Articles 33 and 34 of the General Data Protection 
egulation 2016/679, hereafter: GDPR).3 The EU DBNO imposes 
n obligation on organizations to disclose certain breaches of 
ersonal data to a notification authority and to affected indi- 
iduals (hereafter: data subjects). We will analyse whether the 
U DBNO is effective in increasing social welfare. In addition,
e will propose recommendations for the ex post execution 
nd enforcement of this important piece of legislation.4 r Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 
edical and Financial Information’ ( The Merkle, 30 November 2016) 
d 16 May 2018. 
nsgegevens, see www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl accessed 16 
gard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
ital. In practice, losses of personal data are mostly occurring 
ata records is stored online in our digitalized society. In this 
ociety. 
y Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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Our core methodology will be a law and economics anal-
ysis of incentives and optimal enforcement.5 Unfortunately,
there is little empirical research available, especially on the
EU DBNO, since at the time of conducting this research, the
EU DBNO did not yet apply and hence no data breach data had
been generated. Moreover, there is no reliable data, for exam-
ple concerning the effects of obligations to disclose breaches
of personal data in the EU. The entire EU DBNO is therefore
largely based on assumptions on how data controllers will re-
act to the DBNO, given the particular sanctioning regime. Even
theoretically, it is difficult to predict the effects of the regime
as it strongly depends on specific assumptions. While our con-
tribution aims to explain and analyse the various effects of
the EU DBNO, we will also state when we make these specific
assumptions. In addition, we will utilize the literature on the
effectiveness of DBNOs in the US. In the US, most states have a
DBNO and consequently there is empirical research regarding
the data breach notifications.6 This stream of literature has
covered regulatory impact,7 effectiveness in reducing identity
theft,8 economic effects,9 perceptions from the private sec-
tor 10 and the need to integrate the US state level laws into a
federal law.11 
To the best of our knowledge, a law and economics analy-
sis of the new DBNO in the European Union has not yet been
performed.12 A thorough (ex ante and ex post) scrutiny of the
effects of the DBNO contributes to the development of EU law
and implementing EU data protection policy.13 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 , we intro-
duce the EU DBNO, its origins, aims and its embedded posi-
tion in the General Data Protection Regulation. We also discuss
other breach notification obligations in the EU and compare5 See in this respect also A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, 
Handbook of Law and Economics (vol. 1, 1 st edn, Elsevier 2007) chapter 
6. 
6 See http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and- 
information- technology/security- breach- notification- laws.aspx 
(accessed 16 May 2018) for a brief overview regarding the legisla- 
tive status of US DBNOs. 
7 Jane Winn, ‘Are “Better” Security Breach Notification Laws Pos- 
sible?’ (2009) 24 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1133. 
8 Sasha Romanosky, Rahul Telang and Alessandro Acquisiti, ‘Do 
Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?’ (2011) 30 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 256. 
9 Thomas Lenard and Paul Rubin, ‘Much Ado About Notifica- 
tion’ (2016) 29 Regulation 44; Stefan Laube and Rainer Böhme, ‘The 
economics of mandatory security breach reporting to authorities’ 
(2016) 2 Journal of Cybersecurity 29, uses a theoretical model and 
also involves EU law. 
10 Deirdre Mulligan and Fred Schneider, ‘Doctrine for Cybersecu- 
rity’ (2011) 140 Daedalus 70. 
11 Fabio Bisogni, ‘Proving Limits of State Data Breach Notification 
Laws: Is a Federal Law the Most Adequate Solution?’ (2016) 6 Jour- 
nal of Information Policy 154. 
12 Such an analysis did not take place at a Member State level ei- 
ther. Some EU countries, such as Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Malta and the Netherlands independently adopted a 
DBNO before the entry into force of the GDPR. 
13 The only research we are aware of scrutinizing the EU DBNO is 
from Paul de Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou, ‘The new General 
Data Protection Regulation: Still a sound system for the protection 
of individuals?’ (2016) 32 Computer Law and Security Review 179, 
191, who take a more legal approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the EU DBNO with state level DBNOs in the US. In Section 3 ,
we discuss the social costs and benefits of the DBNO relative
to the threshold of notification. Section 4 discusses whether
organizations would have sufficient incentives to notify, in
the absence of the regulation. We discuss the reasons to be-
lieve that these incentives are likely to be insufficient and
conclude that a market failure is likely to exist in the ab-
sence of regulation. In Section 5 , we discuss whether and in
which cases the DBNO is justified in correcting this market
failure. In doing so, we also take the public costs of the regu-
lation into account. In Section 6 , we continue our discussion
by analysing whether the current legislative design of the up-
coming DBNO is capable of inducing organizations to notify
at an acceptable social cost. The section discusses several so-
cially ideal design choices for optimizing the social potential
of the DBNO and compares them with the actual choices made
by the EU legislator. We will also discuss incentive schemes
related to the implementation of the DBNO that the EU leg-
islator did not include in the actual text of the DBNO, such
as rewarding compliance and the enforcement of sanctions.
Section 7 discusses the optimal notification threshold for both
Article 33 (notification to the DPA) and Article 34 (notification
to data subjects) and Section 8 will provide some concluding
remarks. 
2. The European union data breach 
notification obligation 
This section will start by briefly introducing the origins and
specific characteristics of the EU DBNO in Section 2.1 . Section
2.2 will shortly discuss other EU DBNOs currently in force in
the EU, which mostly concern a certain sector or topic. As
stated in the introduction, the study utilizes the literature on
the effectiveness of DBNOs in the US. In the US, most states
have a DBNO and consequently there is empirical research re-
garding the data breach notifications.14 Section 2.3 discusses
the similarities and differences between the EU and US DBNO
regimes. 
2.1. The DBNO in the GDPR 
The DBNO is part of the extensive legislative data protection
package known as the General Data Protection Regulation ab-
breviated as GDPR. The GDPR regulates many aspects related
to the processing of personal data such as basic principles
(Article 5), lawfulness of processing and individual consent
(Article 6) and rights of individuals that have provided their
data to a third party ( Section 2 of the GDPR). The GDPR entered
into force on May 24, 2016 and applies after a two-year tran-
sition period from May 25, 2018.15 Contrary to its predeces-
sor, Directive 95/46/EC,16 the GDPR will equally apply directly
to every citizen and organization falling within the scope of14 Op. cit. NCSL.org (n 6). 
15 GDPR, Art. 99. 
16 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data [1995] OJ L281/31 (Data Protection Directive). 
1234 computer law & security review 34 (2018) 1232–1246 
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21 Op. cit. De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 13) 191. 
22 The topic of encryption and DBNOs, although not in the con- 
text of the GDPR, is extensively discussed by Mark Burdon, Jason uropean Union law.17 Hence, the GDPR will be an influential 
iece of legislation. The GDPR provides for the DBNO in Arti- 
les 2(2), 4(7), 4(12), 33, 34 and 83(4): 
Article 4 (12) defines a personal data breach as ‘a breach 
f security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruc- 
ion, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access 
o, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed’.
he definition thus focuses on the consequences of the data 
reach. In doing so, the EU legislator incorporates the ‘CIA 
riad’ of confidentiality, integrity or availability of personal 
ata.18 Possible differences in the origin of the data breach,
or instance whether a data breach is intentional or negligent,
re not relevant for defining a data breach. 
Articles 4 (7) states which entities have to notify data 
reaches. These ‘data controllers’ can be legal persons or pub- 
ic authorities. Hence, the DBNO applies to both public and pri- 
ate organisations. 
Article 2 (2) excludes certain data breaches from the notifi- 
ation duty. Data that (a) falls outside the scope of EU law; (b) 
alls within the scope of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU; (c) is
arried out by a natural person for personal use or (most no- 
ably) (d) is used for the execution of criminal prosecution do 
ot have to be notified when breached. 
Articles 33 and 34 regulate the actual obligation to disclose 
 data breach.19 There is an apparent difference in notifying a 
ata breach to a data protection authority (DPA, Article 33) or 
o the data subjects affected (Article 34). With respect to the 
ormer, a data controller has to notify the DPA ‘unless the per- 
onal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and 
reedoms of natural persons’.20 Hence, this ‘likelihood’ is the 
ey threshold for notifying the DPA. Article 33(1) further spec- 
fies that the notification should be as soon as possible, and 
ot later than 72 h after the data breach. However, this is ap- 
arently not a red line, because if it is not feasible to do so, the
rganization can notify later, but has to specify the reasons 
hy it does so. Under 33(3), the data controller has to include 
he nature of the breach, its consequences for data subjects,
 description of counter-measures undertaken and a contact 
oint. When possible, the organization should also include the 
ype and number of affected data subjects and the amount of 
ecords, which have been breached. 
Article 34 shows that the threshold for mandatory notifi- 
ation to data subjects is higher on several points compared 
o the requirements for notifying the DPA ex Article 33. First,
otification to data subjects is only mandatory when the data 
reach is ‘likely to result in a high risk to the rights and free- 
oms’ of data subjects. Hence, where in Article 33 a certain risk 17 Directive 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive) did not contain a 
equirement to notify data breaches. 
18 Shari L. Pfleeger, ‘A Framework for Security Requirements’ 
1991) 10 Computers & Security 515, 518. 
19 Of less importance for this paper it the obligation under Arti- 
le 33 (2) which states that data processors, which process data 
n behalf of the controller, have the obligation to notify the con- 
roller without undue delay after becoming aware of a personal 
ata breach. 
20 As such, it is quite peculiar that the Article speaks of a likeli- 
ood to result in a risk, since risk also contains the element of likeli- 
ood. (risk = likelihood ∗ impact). Hence, within this paper, we will 
ust use the term risk. 
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uffices, in the case of Article 34 the risk should be high. The
DPR does not specify this gap between risk and high risk any 
urther.21 Concerning the temporality of notification, Article 
4(1) solely determines that this should be without undue de- 
ay and does not specify the 72 h of Article 33. In addition, the
rganization does not have to describe the nature of the data 
reach and the amount of data subjects affected when noti- 
ying data subjects. Article 34(3) heightens the threshold even 
urther. This Article provides three possible arguments that 
rganizations can use not to communicate to data subjects.
irst, organizations may refrain from notifying data subjects 
hen the data is made sufficiently difficult to use, for instance 
ith encryption.22 Second, when the organization has taken 
subsequent measures’, which ensure that the high risk will 
o longer materialize, they do not need to notify. Third, no- 
ification to data subjects is not necessary when it would lay 
 disproportionate burden on the organization. Ergo, there is 
uite a large difference in the execution of notification to the 
PA and to the data subject. The GDPR does not state the rea- 
ons for this difference. However, Article 34(4) regulates that 
he DPA may require the organization to still issue an addi- 
ional notification to data subjects when the DPA assesses that 
he likelihood of adverse consequences for data subjects is 
high’ according to Article 34(1). 
Article 83(4) states that a sanction of €10,000,000 or 2% of 
he undertakings turnover, whichever is higher, can be im- 
osed when the data controller fails to notify a data breach.23 
hese sanctions are high compared to the sanctions in the US,
hereby state level DBNOs usually have sanctions in the mag- 
itude of $100,000s or lower.24 
The de jure text of the DBNO is definite and will not change
n the near future.25 However, the ex post execution and en- 
orcement of the obligation will necessitate a combination 
f knowledge regarding EU law, data security and regulatory 
nforcement. Therefore, we believe that the upcoming social 
elfare analysis contributes to the development of EU law and 
olicy after the entry into force of the regulation. 
.2. Other notification duties of data breaches currently 
n force in the EU 
he EU DBNO in the GDPR is not the only notification duty that
urrently applies in the EU.26 In addition, on a Member State eid and Rouhshi Low, ‘Encryption safe harbours and data breach 
otification laws’ (2010) 26 Computer Law & Security Review 520. 
23 GDPR, Art. 83(4); GDPR, Art. 83(2) specifies guidelines for the de- 
ermination of the actual magnitude of the sanction. 
24 Bernold Nieuwesteeg, The Legal Position and Societal Effects of Se- 
urity Breach Notification Laws (1 st edn, deLex 2014) 80. 
25 After all, there have been more than two decades in between 
he entry into force of Regulation 2016/679, and its predecessor, 
irective 95/46/EC. 
26 For a more extensive, albeit slightly out-dated overview (since it 
iscusses the draft-GDPR and proposed NIS-directive), we refer to 
amson Esayes, ‘Breach Notification Requirements Under the Eu- 
opean Union Legal Framework: Convergence, Conflicts, and Com- 
lexity in Compliance’ (2014) 31 J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy 
. 317. 
computer law & security review 34 (2018) 1232–1246 1235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 Ibid 155. 
30 Op. Cit. Nieuwesteeg (n 24). 
31 Aleksandra Vold, ‘That’s All Folks! Alabama Becomes 50 th 
State With Breach Notification Law’ ( Thompson Coburn LLP, 11 
April 2018) https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/ 
cybersecurity- bits- and- bytes/post/2018- 04- 11/that- s- all- folks! 
- alabama- becomes- 50th- state- with- breach- notification- law 
accessed 16 May 2018. 
32 For instance, the thresholds and legal language between the 
US state level DBNOs differ. See Mark Burdon, Bill Lane and Paul 
von Nessen, ‘The mandatory notification of data breaches: Issues 
arising for Australian and EU legal developments’ (2010) 26 Com- 
puter Law & Security Review 115. 
33 See for instance: Fabio Bisogni, ‘Proving Limits of State Data level, there are often many more DBNOs, which could overlap
or be replaced by the EU DBNO. In this section, we will limit
ourselves by discussing DBNOs that could entail personal data
on an EU level. 
Article 4(3) E-privacy directive 2009/136/EG amending directive
2002/58/EC regulates a data breach notification obligation for
telecommunication providers. The wording of the DBNO in
the GDPR has similarities with this directive since it states
that ‘in the case of a personal data breach, the provider of
publicly available electronic communications services shall,
without undue delay, notify the personal data breach to the
competent national authority. When the personal data breach
is likely adversely to affect the personal data or privacy of
a subscriber or individual, the provider shall also notify the
subscriber or individual of the breach without undue delay’.
Commission Regulation 611/2013 further regulates the details
of data breach disclosure in the context of the E-privacy di-
rective. The E-privacy directive and the GDPR are not mu-
tually exclusive, since telecommunication providers also fall
within the scope of the GDPR. However, on some elements, the
data breach disclosure requirements for telecommunication
providers are somewhat stricter. For instance, the data breach
has (when feasible) to be notified within 24 h (Article 2(2) Reg-
ulation 611/2013) compared to the 72 h that are required in
Articles 33 and 34 of the GDPR. 
Article 19(2) eIDAS Regulation 910/2014 regulates the manda-
tory disclosure of a breach of security or the loss of integrity of
trust services providers such as certificate authorities. These
losses could also entail the loss of personal data, and insofar
the breach or loss of integrity adversely affects a natural or
legal person this person should also be notified.27 
Article 30 and Article 31 EU directive 2016/680 on the process-
ing of personal data by competent authorities. Parallel to the leg-
islative process GDPR, a directive was drafted that regulates
data processing for competent authorities, such as the judicial
apparatus of EU Member States. This directive also regulates
data breach disclosure by these competent authorities to the
supervisory authority (Article 30) and the data subject (Article
31). One of the main other differences with the GDPR is that
Member States are free to implement a sanctioning system as
long as this is ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ (Article
57). 
Article 14 (3) NIS (network and information security) Directive
2016/1148. The NIS directive regulates cyber security for net-
work and information systems, which are ‘essential services’
such as the energy and utility industry. Article 14 (3) regu-
lates the security breach notification. Operators of essential
services should, without undue delay, incidents having a sig-
nificant impact on the continuity of the essential services they
provide to a competent authority.28 These incidents, such as
for instance a cyber-attack on a power grid, could also entail
personal data breaches, although one could expect that these
companies would separately disclose these data breaches un-
der the GDPR or E-privacy directive regime. 27 See for a discussion of the topic: Axel Arnbak, Hadi Asghari, 
Michel van Eeten and Nico van Eijk, ‘Security collapse in the HTTPS 
market’ (2014) 57 Communications of the ACM 47. 
28 Which is (often) a different authority than the data protection 
authority of the GDPR. 2.3. Differences between the EU and US legislation 
There are significant differences between the DBNO regimes
in the EU and US. Firstly, the EU DBNO is regulated at a cen-
tral European level instead of at the state level for US laws,
which are partly much older than the EU law.29 California was
the first US state to adopt a DBNO in 2006 and other states
quickly followed.30 As of March 28, 2018, Alabama became the
50th and final state to enact a DBNO.31 This patchwork of state
level DBNOs has provided some challenges. For instance, large
(national) data breaches that involve records of data subjects
in multiples states have to be notified according to the var-
ious (slightly different) legal regimes.32 Therefore, there has
been some literature regarding the desirability of a DBNO on a
central level in the US.33 We will not include this stream of lit-
erature in our main argument because the patchwork issue is
not relevant in the EU since the DBNO is regulated at a central
level. 
Secondly, concerning the sanctioning regime, which is one
of the corner stones for our law and economics analysis, there
are also some notable differences. In the US, the administra-
tive penalties for DBNOs are usually two orders of magnitude
lower than in the EU DBNO. For instance, the Virginia data
breach notification law, which has one of the highest sanc-
tions in the US, allows for an imposition of a $150,000 fine.34
However, in the US, privacy class actions could be a much more
significant cost for organizations.35 
Thirdly, the main reason d’être of the US and EU DBNO is dif-
ferent. Section 3.2 will show that there are three social benefits
for DBNOs: the right to know for data subjects that data is lost
or harmed, information diffusion regarding data breaches and
the possibility to claim damages by these same data subjects.
For the European Union, the protection of personal data and
the right to know has been the primary reason to adopt the EU
DBNO since it is part of the General Data Protection Regulation.
In the US, the multitude of the three social benefits, especially
the right to know and information diffusion, are positioned
more equally.36 
Hence, we will take the peculiarities of the EU legal regime
into account in order to facilitate transplantation of theBreach Notification Laws: Is a Federal Law the Most Adequate So- 
lution’ (2016) 6 Journal of Information Policy 154. 
34 Code of Virginia §18.2-186.6. 
35 Sasha Romanosky, David Hoffman and Alessandro Acquisti, 
‘Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation’ (2014) 11 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 74. 
36 Op. cit. Romanosky, Telang and Acquisti (n 8) 258. 
1236 computer law & security review 34 (2018) 1232–1246 
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40 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] 
OJ C 326/1, Art. 8; European Convention of Human Rights, Art. 7. 
The right to know is described clearly in Article 8(2) of the Charter, 
which states that “everyone has the right of access to data which 
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified”. 
41 GDPR, Art. 1. 
42 Axel Arnbak, Securing private communications: protecting private 
communications security in EU law - fundamental rights, functional 
value chains, and market incentives (1 st edn, Kluwer Law Interna- essons learned on the other side of the Atlantic. For instance,
n pursuing the social benefit of information diffusion in the 
U DBNO, one should be cognizant of the fact that information 
iffusion about personal data breaches and mutual learning 
as not been the main starting point of the legislative process 
hat has led to the GDPR and the DBNO. 
. The social benefits and costs of the DBNO 
his section discusses the social benefits of the DBNO gen- 
rally. The starting point here is that the social benefits of the 
BNO depend on the disclosure threshold. Section 3.1 will fur- 
her introduce this ‘threshold’ perspective. Section 3.2 will 
iscuss the social benefits of a DBNO, while Section 3.3 will 
iscuss its social costs. 
.1. The threshold 
he EU legislator defines the data breach notification thresh- 
ld in the GDPR: data breaches that result in a ‘risk to the 
ights and freedoms of natural persons’ in the case of notify- 
ng the DPA (Article 33). In the case of notification to affected 
ata subjects, this risk should be ‘high’ (Article 34). Naturally,
ome data breaches are more risky than others are.37 Identity 
heft has a high risk, credit card theft has a lower risk and the 
heft of certain passwords and usernames of non-vital web- 
ites, as well as encrypted data, have an even lower risk.38 
ence, theoretically, these data breaches can be plotted on a 
isk continuum. The two thresholds within the EU DBNO are 
ertain points on this risk continuum. This paper discusses 
o what extent the social outcomes of the regulation change 
hen the risk threshold is interpreted more or less strictly and 
onsequently more or fewer data breaches have to be noti- 
ed. To be precise, we will observe the drivers for a change 
n private and social optima when the threshold shifts.39 In 
ection 7 , we will also discuss whether it is socially desirable 
o distinguish between thresholds for notifying to the DPA and 
o the data subjects affected. In the upcoming sections, we will 
rimarily focus on the private and social benefits and costs 
f notification to data subjects ex Article 34 GDPR. In Section 
.1 we will address the different situation of the obligation to 
otify the DPA. 37 This paper does not aim to provide an extensive overview 
f personal data breaches and their risk for individuals, organi- 
ations and society. For the potential consequences of personal 
ata breaches and their risks for individuals and organizations 
ee inter alia Verizon, ‘Data Breach Investigations Report’ http:// 
ww.verizonenterprise.com/verizon- insights- lab/dbir/2017/ 
ccessed 16 May 2018 
38 GDPR, Art. 33(3) under c; Compare for instance the Steam 
ack which also included credit card theft, but also less vital 
sername information: Casey Johnston, ‘Valve confirms Steam 
ack: credit cards, personal info may be stolen’ ( Ars Technica, 
1 November 2011) https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2011/11/ 
alve- confirms- steam- hack- credit- cards- personal- info- may- be- 
tolen/ accessed 16 May 2018. 
39 We assume that data breaches carry a similar amount of 
ecords (being affected consumers). 
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.2. The social benefits 
his section will discuss the social benefits of data breach dis- 
losure to data subjects. First, and foremost for the GDPR, the 
ocial benefit of data breach disclosure is the implementation 
f the data subjects’ ‘right to know’ that their data has been 
ompromised. This ‘right to know’ is an aspect of the funda- 
ental right on the protection of personal data, enshrined in 
he Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 
he European Convention of Human Rights.40 The protection 
f personal data has been the primary reason for the European 
nion to adopt the GDPR and therein the EU DBNO.41 The so- 
ial benefit of the ‘right to know’ is intangible. In addition, its 
ntrinsic value varies among schools of thought. On one side 
f the spectrum, there is a stream of literature that prioritizes 
undamental rights by qualifying it as ‘a first line of defence’.42 
n the other side of the spectrum, there is literature that ar- 
ues that the right to know has a limited value,43 supported 
y empirical research that evaluates the low monetary value 
onsumers attach to this right.44 The valuation of the right to 
now will, in a democratic society, be decided by the policy- 
aker according to the preferences of the voter. In addition,
he value of the right to know will strongly depend upon the 
ature of the data breach. For example, it may be more im- 
ortant for an individual to be aware of an identity theft than 
f the loss of a username or password for a Steam account (a
latform for mobile gaming).45 
Second, data breach disclosure will result in additional in- 
entives for data security improvements for individuals and 
rganizations. There are short and long-term effects and di- 
ect and indirect effects of the diffusion of data breach disclo- 
ure information.46 Data breach disclosure has a short- term 
irect impact on mitigating and avoiding consumer 47 and ional 2016) Chapter 4. 
43 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (6 th edn, Aspen Law & 
usiness 2002) 711. 
44 Ignacio Cofone, ‘The Value of Privacy: Keeping the Money 
here the Mouth is’ (2014) RILE Working Paper Series 
5/2014, http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2015/papers/ 
EIS _ 2015 _ cofone.pdf accessed 16 May 2018. 
45 This gradual decrease occurs independently of the absolute 
alue of the right to know, which, as said, has to be determined 
y societal debate. 
46 Op. cit. Romanosky, Telang and Acquisiti (n 8) 259; This is also 
he aim of the Dutch DBNO which states in its explanatory memo- 
andum that the central availability of the information will stimu- 
ate the ability to learn of organizations which have been breached. 
47 Paul Schwartz and Edward Janger, ‘Notification of Data Secu- 
ity Breaches’ (2007) 105 Michigan Law Review 913, 915; Deirdre 
ulligan, Security Breach Notification Laws: Views from Chief Secu- 
ity Officer (Study Conducted for the Samuelson Law, Technol- 
gy & Public Policy Clinic, University of California-Berkeley School 
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Table 1 – Social costs and benefits. 
Social benefits Marginal 
social 
benefits 
relative to a 
decreasing 
notification 
threshold 
Social costs Marginal social 
costs relative to a 
decreasing 
notification 
threshold 
Right to know Decreasing Administrative 
costs (data 
subject side) 
Minor decrease 
Information 
diffusion 
Decreasing Notification 
fatigue 
Increasing 
Liability Decreasing Over-reaction in 
restricting 
security 
Decreasing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
organizational losses.48 However, organizations and individ-
uals may over-invest in their security improvements.49 In the
long term, according to US chief security officers, data breach
disclosure can foster “cooperation between information secu-
rity departments”.50 This diffusion of information has positive
effects on overall security.51 Furthermore, indirectly, a data
breach disclosure raises the public’s awareness regarding cy-
ber security. Similar to the right to know, we assume that the
information benefit for security improvement is lower when
the significance of the data breach risk is lower. 
Third, the potential liability claim that can follow a disclo-
sure has a social benefit. Liability results in behaviour that
incentivizes organizations to internalize some of the exter-
nalities in cyber security. Quite naturally, individuals can only
claim damages when a data breach disclosure becomes public
and they are aware of it. Liability can even accumulate in class
actions.52 
3.3. The social costs 
There are also social costs of data breach disclosure. First, in-
dividuals and organizations whose data have been breached
incur direct costs because they have to spend time and money
in order to analyse and mitigate their impact. This might be a
minor cost per record, but if hundreds of thousands of records
are being breached, the numbers quickly add up.53 The cost
of consumer actions might be greater than expected because
consumers can spend several hours of time on their accounts
and impose costs on firms by requesting more information
on, for instance, new credit cards. Lenard and Rubin estimate
that this cost is $10 per data subject.54 Second, an increase
in the amount of notifications can lead to a decrease in the
positive effects of disclosure, because data subjects can pay
less attention to each individual data breach. Subsequently,
the information diffusion becomes less meaningful and even-
tually all data breaches could just be perceived as irrelevant
information.55 We label this effect ‘notification fatigue’. Thus,of Law, 2007) 23, available through https://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
files/cso _ study.pdf accessed 16 May 2018. This discussion is linked 
to the timing of the notification studied by Fabio Bisogni, ‘Data 
Breaches and the Dilemmas in Notifying Customers’ (2015), pre- 
sented at The fourteenth Annual Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Security, Delft, 22-23 June 2015. The faster the disclo- 
sure takes place, the more benefits for consumers. We expect this 
to be equal over significance. 
48 Op. cit. Romanosky, Telang and Acquisti (n 8) 258. 
49 Op. cit. Lenard and Rubin (n 9) 48. 
50 Op. cit. Mulligan (n 47) 18. 
51 Hulisi Ogut, Srinivasan Raghunathan and Nirup M. Menon, ‘In- 
formation Security Risk Management through Self-Protection and 
Insurance’ (2005) The University of Texas School of Management 
1, 31. 
52 Especially in the US, see op. cit. Romanosky, Hoffman and Ac- 
quisti (n 8). 
53 For instance a consumer spends 10 minutes on gaining knowl- 
edge about a data breach, at an 18 euro per hour opportunity cost, 
a 100.000 record breach can costs society 300.000 euro. These costs 
are public costs insofar as they are not being compensated by the 
private organization. 
54 Op. cit. Lenard and Rubin (n 9) 47. It is more likely to be on the 
upper side of the spectrum. 
55 Op. cit. Mulligan (n 47) 33. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
notification fatigue does not only affect the benefits of the
(least important) data breach, but also has negative external-
ities towards other data breaches. All data breaches become
less important with the introduction of an additional data
breach (through lowering the threshold). Likewise, as soon
as more notifications are being made, for example by lower-
ing the notification threshold, the benefits of the additional
data breach will decrease and the costs (the negative exter-
nality to other data breaches) will increase. Third, organiza-
tions may over-invest in security because of notifying the data
breach. However, this is not expected to be a very significant
social cost because in general, organizations have incentives
to under-invest in cyber security.56 
3.4. Social costs versus social benefits 
Table 1 below displays the social costs and benefits relative to
a decreasing notification threshold. 
Marginal social benefits all decrease when less risky data
breaches have to be notified. The marginal administrative cost
is likely to decrease, because the data subject will take more
time in reviewing a risky data breach than a less risky data
breach. However, the decrease will quickly flatten out, because
a certain base line of investigative costs have to be made by
each data subject. In addition, over-investment by organiza-
tions will be less likely when less important data breaches
have to be notified. Notification fatigue will logically strongly
increase when a larger pool of data breaches have to be no-
tified. Notification fatigue drives overall marginal social costs
to increase and the minor decrease of administrative cost and
the overall minor decreasing effect of over-investment cannot
compensate for that. In sum: there may be positive social ben-
efits from notification, but these can be reduced because of
notification fatigue. To reduce that risk, determining the ap-
propriate threshold for notification is crucial (see Section 7 ).
For now, we assume that a smart threshold will be determined
and that disclosure is therefore socially beneficial. That then
leads to the following question: 56 Due to the mainly positive externalities that are present in cy- 
ber security. 
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. Will there be spontaneous disclosure in the 
bsence of the obligation? 
his section discusses whether there will be spontaneous dis- 
losure in the absence of the obligation. We will assess the pri- 
ate costs and benefits because of disclosure. Section 4.1 will 
iscuss private benefits and Section 4.2 will discuss private 
osts. 
.1. Private benefits 
irst, organizations experience a benefit because the disclo- 
ure of data breaches allows for the faster mitigation of the 
mpact of the breach. This reduces direct costs. This is espe- 
ially relevant when consumers need to take action after the 
ata breach, such as refraining from using stolen credit card 
nformation or using old passwords. Moreover, a DPA can po- 
entially assist in mitigating the breach by providing targeted 
dvice. 
.2. Private costs 
esides benefits, private parties also incur costs when disclos- 
ng data breaches.57 First, there are the administrative costs of 
isclosing data breaches to the affected data subjects. How- 
ver, the major risk is (perceived) reputation damage. The lit- 
rature shows that data breach disclosure does have limited 
ingle digit (1 or 2%) negative market value impact on the short 
erm.58 However, research that focussed on the long term sug- 
ests, “information security breaches have minimal long-term 
conomic impact”.59 We believe that the Target stock price ex- 57 These private costs, and the necessity to balance these costs 
ith the social benefits of DBNOs have been debated in the liter- 
ture. For instance, Mark Burdon, Bill Lane and Paul von Nessen, 
Data breach notification law in the EU and Australia – Where to 
ow?’ (2012) 28 Computer Law & Security Review 296, 307 men- 
ion competing rationales, such as the ‘dual conflict of effective 
onsumer protections relating to identity theft threats and min- 
mising corporate compliance costs.’ 
58 Reputation damage is usually quantified as the difference in 
ompany value before and after the disclosure. Sanjay Goel and 
any Hawsky, ‘Estimating the market impact of security breach 
nnouncements on firm values’ (2009) 46 Information & Manage- 
ent 404, 408, used such an event study methodology. They mea- 
ured the market value of the company a few days before and after 
he notion of a security breach and found a negative effect of on 
verage about 1% of the market value. Huseyin Cavusoglu, Biren- 
ra Mishra and Srinivasan Raghunathan, ‘The Effect of Internet 
ecurity Breach Announcement on Market Value: Capital Market 
eactions for Breached Firms and Internet Security Developers’ 
2004) 9 International Journal of Electronic Commerce 69, 71, iden- 
ified through a similar approach an incidental loss of stock prices 
f 2.1%. They discuss direct and indirect costs of data breaches, 
ut this is a slightly different topic, as this paper is about to talk 
bout data breach disclosure. Pierangelo Rosati, Mark Cummins, 
eter Deeney, Fabian Gogolin, Lisa van der Werff and Theo Lynn, 
The effect of data breach announcements beyond the stock price: 
mpirical evidence on market activity’ (2017) 49 International Re- 
iew of Financial Analysis 146, 152, find that market activity on the 
hort term slightly higher after a data breach announcement. 
59 Myung Ko and Carlos Dorantes, ‘The impact of information se- 
urity breaches on financial performance of the breached firms: 
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mple shows the difficulty in pointing out long-term reputa- 
ional damage. Target was the subject of a very significant data 
reach in December 2013. Fig. 1 below displays the graph of the 
tock market value of Target. It is impossible to identify the 
ay of the data breach, as on other trading days stock prices 
id fluctuate more than during the event in late December.60 
In practice, the distribution of real reputational costs has a 
ong-term effect. Some organization will suffer no significant 
ong-term reputation damage, while other companies will go 
ankrupt because of the disclosure of the data breach.61 The 
ormer group are likely to consist of organizations with a sta- 
le customer base that are able to exploit lock-in strategies 
nd are too big to fail. A data breach does not reduce the like-
ihood that consumers buy the product or services of these 
rganizations. The latter group has a small customer base 
nd/or offers products with trust as a core selling point.62 Nev- 
rtheless, the perceived value of reputation damage is more im- 
ortant than its objective value. As a security officer pointed 
ut, “fear of reputation damage … drives organizations to take 
teps to at least evaluate, if not correct and enhance secu- 
ity mechanisms”.63 Alternatively, consider the following blog 
ost: “Our head of IT Security (of a major telecom) told us once,
we have one key metric: Don’t show up in the Wall Street Jour- 
al for a security breach.’ ”64 
A third issue is liability. The general logic is that when a 
ata breach becomes public, the opportunity arises for the 
ublic to sue organizations. Therefore, notifying data breaches 
aises the likelihood of liability costs. Romanosky finds that 
hen consumers suffer financial harm, the risk of litigation 
ncreases with a factor of 3.5.65 However, two drivers mitigate n empirical investigation’ (2006) 16 Journal of Information Tech- 
ology Management 13, 20, used a matched sample comparison 
nalysis instead of event study methodology to investigate the im- 
act of security breaches on firm performance. These observations 
bout long-term impact should be taken with care, because the ef- 
ect of the data breach is much harder to disentangle from other 
xogenous variables and high quality panel data is not available. 
60 ‘In the days prior to Thanksgiving 2013, someone installed 
alware in Target’s security and payments system designed to 
teal every credit card used at the company’s 1,797 U.S. stores.’ 
ee Michael Riley, Ben Elgin, Dune Lawrence and Carol Matlack, 
Missed Alarms and 40 Million Stolen Credit Card Numbers: 
ow Target Blew It’ ( Bloomberg, 17 March 2014) https://www. 
loomberg.com/news/articles/2014- 03- 13/target- missed- 
arnings- in- epic- hack- of- credit- card- data accessed 16 May 
018. 
61 Robert Layton and Paul A. Watters, ‘A methodology for estimat- 
ng the tangible cost of data breaches’ (2014) 19 Journal of Infor- 
ation Security and Applications 321 also indicate that firms can 
till grow, while writing-off some expenditures related to reputa- 
ion damage. 
62 Compare for instance the 2017 Verizon data breach with the 
011 Diginotar data breach. The former did not encounter major 
ssues while the latter went bankrupt. 
63 Op. cit. Mulligan (n 47) 14. 
64 See the following article on Bruce Schneier’s blog: Bruce 
chneier, ‘Breach Notification Laws’ ( Schneier on Security, 21 
anuary 2009) https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/01/ 
tate _ data _ brea.html accessed 16 May 2018. 
65 Op. cit. Romanosky, Hoffman and Acquisti (n 8) 76. This re- 
earch is based on US data where the use of liability law is more 
ommon than in other jurisdictions. 
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Fig. 1 – Stock market value of target corp. 
Table 2 – summary of private costs and benefits. 
Private benefits Marginal 
private 
benefits 
relative to a 
decreasing 
notification 
threshold 
Private costs Marginal private 
costs relative to a 
decreasing 
notification 
threshold 
Mitigation of 
impact and 
improvement 
of security 
Decreasing Administrative 
costs 
Slight decrease 
Reduction in 
reputation 
damage 
Decreasing Reputational 
damage 
Decreasing 
Additional 
perceived 
reputation 
damage 
Decreasing 
Liability costs Decreasing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 Surely, there are data breaches for which private benefits of 
disclosure exceed private costs. For instance, when there is a (per- 
ceived) high likelihood that a breach will be made public by a third 
party. In such a situation the difference in reduced (perceived) 
reputation damage and the threat of liability claims may weigh 
against disclosure costs. There have been cases of spontaneous 
disclosure of data breaches in the past, although the ‘spontaneity’ 
of these disclosures is sometimes hard to disentangle from local 
legal obligations. For instance, in the Netherlands, there has been 
a local data breach notification law since January 1, 2016 until the 
application of the GDPR. In addition, contractual obligations be- 
tween parties could have triggered data breach disclosure in the 
past. Also, cases of spontaneous disclosure are hard to retrieve 
since there is obviously no obligation to notify a DPA in the ab- this effect. First, a well-planned notification strategy for or-
ganizations can mitigate liability costs. Liability risks can be
reduced when the organization is able to show that it took ap-
propriate action in notification and reduction of the risk (such
as immediate disclosure itself). In the U.S., the likelihood of an
organization being sued is six times lower when the organiza-
tion offers free credit monitoring after the data breach.66 Sec-
ond, when a company intentionally conceals data breaches
and they nevertheless become public, it can reasonably be
expected that the likelihood and impact of claims will be
higher. We summarize private costs and benefits in Table 2
below. 
Private benefits and costs are strongly correlated with the
magnitude of the data breach risk. Private benefits become
higher when data breaches that have to be notified are more
risky, while decreasing when breaches become less risky. With66 Ibid 91. regard to private costs, we expect these administrative costs of
disclosure to decrease slightly. This is related to the assump-
tion that the administrative procedure to inform customers
will take slightly more time when the breach is more signif-
icant because it can be expected that data subjects demand
more information. We expect the other marginal private costs
to decrease relative to a decreasing notification threshold.
Concerning absolute numbers, private costs are (perceived as)
high and certain, while private benefits are indirect and un-
certain. Hence, we assume that (at least in the perception
of the organization that has the notification duty) the pri-
vate costs of data breach disclosure are higher than the pri-
vate benefits. Ergo, there are few incentives for a private actor
spontaneously to notify data breaches in the absence of the
obligation.67 
5. The case for the DBNO 
Section 3 observed that a data breach notification has so-
cial benefits, most notably bringing information to the market
that serves as a right to know’ and the information diffusion.
Section 4 observed that data breach disclosure most likely im-
poses a net cost on private parties. There will not in mostsence of the law. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no 
further research conducted on the spontaneous disclosure of per- 
sonal data breaches in the EU. 
1240 computer law & security review 34 (2018) 1232–1246 
Table 3 – Public costs of a DBNO. 
Public costs (costs associated 
with the operation of the 
legal system) a 
Marginal public costs relative to a 
decreasing notification 
threshold 
Adoption costs Sunk costs 
Costs of DPA Stable 
Costs of enforcement Stable for general enforcement, up 
to threshold violation specific 
enforcement 
Costs of the digital first aid kit Stable 
a Steven Shavell, ‘The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Op- 
timality of Suit and of Settlement’ (1999) 19 International Review of 
Law and Economics 99, 100: “To amplify, the private cost of a suit 
is less than the social cost of a suit, for that includes the injurer’s 
costs as well as the public costs (those costs associated with the 
operation of the judicial system).”
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69 Op. cit. Nieuwesteeg (n 24) 80. The majority of the DBNOs in the 
world apply penalties in order to deter non-compliance. 
70 GDPR, Art. 83(4). 
71 See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Gerrit de Geest, ‘Carrots, 
sticks, and the multiplication effect’ (2010) 26 Journal of Law, Eco- 
nomics, and Organization 365, 365, compare the discussion in 
supra Section 2.2 on perceived reputation damage. ases be spontaneous disclosure in the absence of the obli- 
ation. This section examines in 5.1 whether social surplus 
s likely to remain, even when net private costs are taken 
nto account and argues that there is a case for regulation.
ection 5.2 discusses the public cost of enforcing the BDNO. 
.1. Is there a case for the DBNO? 
ost data breach disclosures impose a cost on data con- 
rollers. Up to the threshold, the social benefits outweigh the 
net) private costs. Within this area, there is a case for reg- 
lation. The social optimal threshold for disclosure will lie a 
otch higher, because net private losses have to be added to 
he social costs. The data breaches below the threshold will 
ave insufficient positive effects to compensate for the nega- 
ive effects and generate a social loss. It becomes quite clear 
hat this is important to give a direction for distinguishing and 
larifying the threshold, which we will do in Section 7 . 
.2. Public cost of the DBNO 
here are also public costs of the DBNO ( Table 3 ). The first is
he adoption of the regulation as such. There are costs associ- 
ted with the discussion and adoption of the regulation by the 
U legislator. These are sunk costs and the regulator can also 
ncur these costs when the regulation is not adopted. There 
re also costs involved in processing the notifications at the 
PA. Furthermore, there are enforcement costs 68 and possible 
osts involved in offering a digital first aid kit, discussed in the 
ext section. 
When we add the public costs to the new social optimum,
he socially optimal threshold becomes higher. 68 Op. cit. Polinsky and Shavell (n 5); Sharon Oded, ‘Inducing cor- 
orate compliance: A compound corporate liability regime’ (2011) 
1 International Review of Law and Economics 272, 273; George 
tigler, ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws’ (1970) 78 Journal of 
olitical Economy 526, 526. 
t
s
i
l
. Will the EU DBNO sufficiently induce data 
ontrollers to notify? 
ection 3 argued that disclosure is socially beneficial for a cer- 
ain area of data breaches (up to the threshold). Section 4 con- 
luded that, for the majority of those data breaches, there 
ould be insufficient incentives for spontaneous disclosure by 
rivate parties. Section 5 argued that there is a case for regu- 
ation, because these social benefits are higher than private 
osts, provided that the benefits of regulation outweigh the 
ublic costs of regulation. The question this section aims to 
ddress is whether the European regulation will sufficiently 
nduce data controllers to notify those data breaches for which 
isclosure is socially beneficial. 
.1. The administrative fine 
he administrative fine is the main design parameter that 
nduces data controllers to notify within Articles 33, 34 and 
4(4) the DBNO; especially Article 84(4) GDPR gives DPAs this 
ower.69 In the case of non-compliance with the regulation,
PAs are granted the power to impose an administrative fine 
f €10,000,000 or 2% of the undertakings turnover, whichever 
s higher .70 The fine can be imposed when the data controller 
onceals a data breach or does not notify in due time. The 
dministrative fine has several theoretical advantages. First,
he fine has a multiplication effect. The fine has an effect 
nce imposed, as well as the threat of the effect than can be
xecuted multiple times once data controllers comply. Thus,
hen the sanction is set at a deterrent level that forces all 
ata controllers to comply, the sanction itself is costless, be- 
ause it does not have to be executed. In such a situation, only
he threat suffices.71 Moreover, even if the fine has to be im- 
osed, the fine itself is considered a socially costless transfer 
f money (contrary to other threats such as imprisonment).72 
ast, higher sanctions allow for lower levels of enforcement 
o remain an identical level of deterrence. The high sanctions 
n Article 84(4) GDPR consequently could save enforcement 
osts. 
However, the high fine in Article 84(4) GDPR also has several 
isadvantages. For small data controllers, the maximum de 
acto fine will be lower because a high fine will go beyond their
olvency.73 Next, high sanctions can lead to over- and under- 
eterrence when the perception of the likelihood of detec- 
ion differs from the actual likelihood of detection.74 This phe- 
omenon occurs especially when there is a low likelihood of 72 Op. cit. Polinsky and Shavell (n 5). 
73 Also, in practice, it is likely that most actual fines will be lower 
han the maximum, lowering their deterrent effect. Article 83(2) 
pecifies several circumstances of the case that have to be taken 
nto account for the actual determination of the fine, such as neg- 
igence and mitigation measures. 
74 Op. cit. Polinsky and Shavell (n 5). 
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detection. To be specific, data controllers could be incentivized
to notify data breaches that are subject to mandatory notifi-
cation (because they do not result in a risk for data subjects)
just because they want to be ‘on the safe side’. This assumes
that the data controllers do not have exact information about
the two thresholds. This is reasonable to expect, because cur-
rently the thresholds are not defined any further than the
qualification of ‘risk’ or ‘high risk’ to the rights and freedoms
of data subjects. In a situation of over-deterrence, data con-
trollers will disclose data breaches for which disclosure is not
socially beneficial and this will result in a social welfare loss.
Furthermore, a high administrative fine can incentivize data
controllers not to detect data breaches.75 Closely connected,
people show risk-seeking behaviour when facing losses. This
undermines the deterrent effect of high fines.76 A last disad-
vantage of the (high) administrative fine is that it will punish
the organization itself (and thus the shareholders and cus-
tomers) and not the people responsible for concealing the data
breach.77 
6.2. Enforcement of the fine 
The administrative fine of the DBNO is high, but the expected
value of the administrative fine is the magnitude of the fine
multiplied by the likelihood of detection. Hence, its deterrent
effect largely depends on the ability of the DPA effectively to
enforce at acceptable social cost.78 What should be the level
of deterrence? The level of deterrence should exceed the net
private cost that data controllers incur when disclosing a data
breach.79 This private cost is not static but varies across data
controllers and will also be different for each data breach.
Section 4 concluded that private costs are (perceived as) high
and certain, while private benefits are indirect and uncertain.
Hence, there is a significant gap between private costs and
benefits that should be closed by an appropriate deterrent ef-
fect of the DBNO in order to induce an organization to provide
sufficient notification. 
The appropriate level of deterrence can be accomplished
through enforcing the regulation and by increasing the likeli-
hood of detection. The GDPR does not give further instruction
on how to enforce the obligation, apart from the statement
that enforcement should be ‘strong’ according to Recital 7.
This section will discuss several possibilities for enforcement
of the EU DBNO. 75 See also A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, ‘Mandatory 
versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks’ (2006) Harvard Law 
School, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business 
Discussion Paper Series 564/2006, 4 http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w12776 accessed 16 May 2018. 
76 See the seminal article of Daniel Kahneman and Amon Tver- 
sky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’ (1979) 
47 Econometrica 263. 
77 See for a more extensive discussion op. cit. Polinsky and Shavell 
(n 5). 
78 See also op. cit. Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (n 72) and Gary 
Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’ (1968) 
76 The Journal of Political Economy 169. According to the theory 
of deterrence, the strictness of the stick equals the magnitude of 
sanction stick multiplied by the probability of detection. 
79 See supra Section 4 . General enforcement concerns auditing random organiza-
tions to investigate whether they comply with the DBNO. Gen-
eral enforcement is characterized by the fact that it does not
depend on the number of individuals who actually commit
harmful acts.80 An example of the current Dutch DBNO that
will be replaced by the EU DBNO illustrates that general en-
forcement will be costly.81 Suppose the Dutch DPA wants to
achieve a likelihood of detection of 10% and it will be able suc-
cessfully to find a data breach in half of the cases where one
has occurred.82 Then it must audit 20% out of the total number
of 132,000 organizations in the Netherlands.83 No more than
20 organizations per year can be audited by one FTE.84 Hence,
to audit 20% one needs 1320 FTE. Given an average annual to-
tal cost for skilled personnel of €100,000, the regulatory costs
of enforcement rise to €132,200,000 per annum. In 2017, the
total capacity of the Dutch DPA in Netherlands is 72,5 FTE,
that can only be partially deployed for enforcement.85 Sup-
pose that 25% of the Dutch DPAs total capacity (18,125 FTE)
can be devoted to general enforcement of the DBNO. This re-
sults in an actual likelihood of detection of around 0,27%. In
addition, general enforcement causes significant administra-
tive costs for the organizations that are subject to an audit.
Many of them have nothing to hide and have to devote time
and money to the auditing procedure, which aggravates the
social cost of general enforcement. Ergo, we believe that gen-
eral enforcement is not a socially efficient instrument to in-
crease the deterrent effect of the DBNO.86 
Ex ante risk based auditing is a more efficient means of audit-
ing. This approach starts with prioritizing sectors or organiza-
tions that are most likely to violate the obligation. In the US,
for instance, healthcare and financial institutions have been
subject to data breaches relatively more often than other sec-
tors.87 In addition, DPAs can prioritize their enforcement ef-
forts on those sectors where the disclosure of data breaches is
most likely to lead to the highest social welfare increase. Log-
ically, ex ante risk based auditing reduces costs because the
average likelihood of detection is likely to increase per audit.
However, this should be weighed against the cost of ex ante
efforts in determining the risk. When these costs are kept suf-
ficiently low, for instance through diffusing information about
risk assessments across the EU, risk based auditing is prefer-
able to general enforcement. However, a labour intensive au-
diting procedure is likely to remain. 80 Op. cit. Oded (n 68) 273. 
81 Op. cit. Laube and Böhme (n 9) 37. 
82 We assume 50% likelihood of detection because data con- 
trollers can quite easily actively conceal data breaches by for in- 
stancing removing log files about the breach. 
83 According to the Dutch estimation when the DBNO was 
adopted. 
84 Assuming 10 days FTE work for an intensive auditing proce- 
dure. 
85 See www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl accessed 16 May 2018. 
The Dutch DPA also has other tasks. 
86 Op. cit. Laube and Böhme (n 9) 37. 
87 Based on the US Privacy Rights Clearinghouse data set that is 
for instance analysed by Benjamin Edwards, Steven Hofmeyr and 
Stephanie Forrest, ‘Hype and Heavy Tails: A Closer Look at Data 
Breaches’ (2016) 2 Journal of Cybersecurity 3, 4. 
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91 For instance, criminal penalties are not provided for in the 
GDPR. However, the GDPR allows certain administrative fines to 
be fined as a criminal fine because of the legal system of some 
of the Member States and sometimes the Member States are free 
to choose the type of penalties when they have not being har- 
monized (Recital 151 and 152 GDPR). This is also related to the 
competence of the EU. See for example Paul Graig and Grainne de 
Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6 th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2015). Criminal penalties have two advantages. First, they hit 
certain natural persons directly. Second, a criminal penalty is in- 
sensitive for the financial situation of an individual (the limited Violation specific enforcement entails that the DPA enforces 
iolations of the EU DBNO that are discovered by third parties,
uch as ethical hackers, the media and data subjects affected 
y the data breach.88 Verizon suggests that third parties dis- 
over 27% of the data breaches that reach the public. Unfortu- 
ately, this does not mean that of all data breaches, 27% will 
e discovered in this way. Hence, we cannot exclusively rely 
n the discoveries by third parties when only a small propor- 
ion of data breaches reaches the public. Suppose that 10% of 
he organizations experience a data breach. When 1% of the 
ata breaches reaches the public, 0.27% will be discovered by 
hird parties (and 0,73% will be disclosed by the organization 
tself). For violation specific enforcement, it is necessary that 
hird parties have sufficient incentives to notify the DPA. Con- 
equently, they must be fully compensated for their costs in 
otifying the DPA.89 Ideally, they must solely notify the DPA,
ecause the DPA needs to determine whether disclosure to 
ata subjects is socially beneficial. Otherwise, inducing third 
arties to discover data breaches could contribute to notifica- 
ion fatigue. Similar to the stimulation of third party disclo- 
ure, the DPA could also encourage data breach notification 
y whistle-blowers by compensating them for their private 
osses. The fact that violation specific enforcement capitalizes 
pon the efforts of third parties or whistle-blowers, leads to 
he conclusion that it could be a more socially beneficial type 
f enforcement than ex ante enforcement, because the DPA 
oes not have to engage enforcement activities with an un- 
ertain outcome. On the downside, the level of deterrence will 
ully depend on the capacity of those parties to discover data 
reaches. 
.3. The digital first aid kit 
ection 4 demonstrated that spontaneous disclosure in the 
bsence of the obligation is unlikely. In addition, a mere data 
reach notification obligation without additional incentive 
chemes for compliance will not yield sufficient spontaneous 
isclosure. The previous section discussed the deterrent effect 
f the threat in the EU DBNO. It is likely that, although the law- 
aker is fully informed, they are not able to set deterrence at 
uch a level that it will induce data controllers to notify at a 
ocially acceptable cost. This is related to the fact that the ex- 
nte enforcement of administrative sanctions in the DBNO is 
ostly and that ex post enforcement depends significantly on 
hird parties. Theoretical and empirical evidence 90 supports 88 Op. cit. Verizon (n 37) 3. When the risk of third party disclosure 
s very high, it will have the same effect as intense enforcement, 
ut we assume that this is not the case; White hackers penetrate 
ecurity systems in good faith in order to check security. 
89 Gerrit de Geest and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, ‘The Rise of Car- 
ots and the Decline of Sticks’ (2013) 80 University of Chicago Law 
eview 341, 363. 
90 Op. cit. Laube and Böhme (n 9); Op. cit. Nieuwesteeg (n 24) 110. 
lso there is anecdotal evidence that there is under-compliance 
n the case of the Dutch DBNO, see for instance: Rob de Lange, 
Bedrijven negeren Wet meldplicht datalekken’ ( Het Financieel 
agblad, 1 February 2017) https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1185463/ 
eel-bedrijven-negeren-wet-meldplicht-datalekken accessed 16 
ay 2018. 
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his statement, although there is limited attention in the lit- 
rature to the effect of the unprecedented high administra- 
ive fines of the EU DBNO in the GDPR. The question arises 
f whether there are other complementary options available 
hat can further induce data controllers to comply with the 
BNO at reasonable social cost. In this and the next section,
e will focus on those options that do not involve a significant 
lteration of the GDPR. Instead, we focus on more feasible in- 
entive schemes, which can be implemented within the scope 
f the GDPR.91 
When it is expected that most data controllers will con- 
eal data breaches or will refrain from detecting them, re- 
arding compliance (offering ‘carrots’) may have lower costs 
han sanctioning and detecting violators (using ‘sticks’).92 The 
ingle ‘carrot’ that we will discuss is the possibility for the 
PA to provide the organization with specific tailored infor- 
ation that can reduce the impact of the data breach and re- 
uce reputation damage; the ‘digital first aid kit’.93 In other 
ords, if data controllers know that the DPA has essential in- 
ormation that will assist them in being resilient concerning 
he data breach, they will have additional incentives to dis- 
lose. This section discusses its opportunities, drawbacks and 
re-requisites. 
Opportunities. Rewarding compliance works best in situa- 
ions when organizations have different effort costs in com- 
lying.94 This is the case in complying with a DBNO. The dis- 
losure of more risky data breaches will have a higher cost 
han the disclosure of less risky data breaches. The advantage 
f the digital first aid kit is that it can offer greater rewards for
ore risky data breaches in the sense that for more risky data 
reaches the value of useful assistance is also higher. Further- 
ore, the digital first aid kit benefits social welfare because 
t propels the diffusion of information in cyber security. For ndividual wealth issue of administrative sanctions is not of con- 
ern) when the criminal penalty is non-monetary (op. cit. Polinsky 
nd Shavell (n 5). 
92 Donald Wittman, ‘Liability for harm or restitution of benefit?’ 
1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies 57 has analysed the role of ad- 
inistrative costs. He argued that if most organizations do not 
omply with the law, which is the expected outcome of the EU 
BNO, rewarding compliers is cheaper than punishing violators. 
93 Another possible compliance rewarding scheme is the reduc- 
ion of liability for data breaches when a data breach is noti- 
ed in due time. However, liability is largely regulated by private 
aw within the Member States and therefore does not fall within 
he scope of the GDPR. In addition, the DPA could offer a mone- 
ary compensation for the administrative costs in notifying a data 
reach. However, this can be costly and can have perverse and dis- 
ortive effects and therefore we will not discuss this option. 
94 Op. cit. De Geest and Dari-Mattiacci (n 90) 367. 
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99 Op. cit. Laube and Böhme (n 9) 19. 
100 Op. cit. Nieuwesteeg (n 24) 69 and for instance: Pim van der 
Beek, ‘Autoriteit registreert 700 meldingen datalekken; ( Com- 
putable , 8 March 2016) https://www.computable.nl/artikel/ 
nieuws/security/5716753/250449/autoriteit-registreert-700- 
meldingen-datalekken.html accessed 16 May 2018. 
101 Robert Cooter, ‘Expressive law and economics’ (1998) 27 Journal 
of Legal Studies 585; Robert Cooter, ‘Do good laws make good cit- 
izens? An economic analysis of internalized norms’(2000) 86 Vir- 
ginia Law Review 1577. 
102 Francesco Parisi, The Language of Law and Economics (Cambridge 
University Press 2013) 113. this, it is necessary that the costs of the stimulation of in-
formation diffusion remain lower than its benefits. This can
be achieved through cooperation between national DPAs and
automation of the first aid kit regarding its internal decision
making process, about which information to give to which
data controllers 
Drawbacks. Rewarding compliance has more transaction
costs than penalties, because the former has to be carried out
each time the data controller complies, and the latter only has
to be executed when the data controller does not comply with
the regulation.95 However, this effect is partly mitigated by the
fact that high enforcement costs are likely to prohibit the law-
maker from setting deterrence at such a level that it will in-
duce data controllers to notify at a socially acceptable cost.
To put it simply, there will still be many violators because the
deterrent level cannot be set sufficiently high. However, the
digital first aid kit has additional social benefits that justify
some cost in their execution. A second drawback is that re-
warding compliance can have distortive effects on the equal
distribution of goods when not applied uniformly.96 Indeed,
some organizations will experience more benefits than oth-
ers will and this is something to be taken into consideration
within the execution of the rewarding scheme. In this con-
text, a third drawback is that a compliance rewarding scheme
can create moral hazard, especially when the digital first aid
kit would provide valuable information on cyber security that
data controllers would otherwise have to pay for. The specific
design should therefore take the risk of moral hazard into ac-
count. 
Pre-requisites. First, it is indispensable for the DPA to invest
in becoming a hub and knowledge centre for diffusion of data
breach information.97 It is required that the DPA is able quickly
to categorize the data breach and estimate whether the orga-
nization affected needs assistance and which information it
is relevant to provide. National DPAs can benefit from the Eu-
ropean Union’s wide application of the GDPR.98 This requires
that the DPA can quickly make an estimation, based on the
nature of the data breach and the mitigation measures, to as-
sess which lessons learned from other data breaches in their
database should be transferred to the organization making the
data breach. An import aspect is the implementation of a con-
tinuous feedback loop that tests whether the information was
in fact valuable for the organization. Advanced data analyt-
ics is necessary here. Second, in order to achieve the desirable
network effects of information diffusion, the enforcement and
investments in knowledge, related to the digital first aid kit,
must be above average in the early stages of the application
of the GDPR. The digital first aid kit solely functions when in-
formation about best practices and mitigation measures is al-
ready there. Hence, this information needs to be obtained first
without the digital first aid kit. This necessitates excessive en-
forcement in the early stages of the GDPR in order to generate
the necessary data breach notifications to propel the network
effects. 95 Op. cit. Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (n 72) 365. 
96 Op. cit. Wittman (n 93) 68. 
97 See supra Section 4.1 . 
98 Already stressed in the GDPR, Art. 60, 61 and 62. 
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6.4. The expressive function of the DBNO 
Section 6.1 showed that enforcement based on penalties is
costly. As security economists, Laube and Böhme conclude
that after modelling mandatory data breach disclosure: “Se-
curity breach notification laws without security audits, regard-
less of the level of sanctions, cannot incentivize firms to re-
port security breaches to authorities, given positive disclosure
costs.”99 However , despite the lack of positive incentives to
do so, data breaches are still notified in the Netherlands and
the U.S. without enforcement.100 The fact that organizations
have disclosed data breaches despite clear incentives not to
do so, can be attributed to the likelihood of detection through
third party enforcement. However, it could also be attributed
to the expressive function of the regulation, which is another
scheme that affects the incentives of organizations. Through
its expressive function, the regulation affects behaviour by
internalizing social norms.101 The basic premise is that data
controllers can gain utility from the fact that they are com-
pliant with the regulation.102 Stimulating the expressive func-
tion is a socially cost-efficient way to persuade private parties,
since there are almost no variable social costs involved. The
EU DBNO can have a strong expressive function, based on its
two core societal goals. 
Right to know of individuals. The expressive function of the
EU DBNO on protecting the fundamental right to the protec-
tion of personal data is already present. It is embedded in the
broader GDPR that aims to execute the fundamental rights to
the protection of personal data. 
Information diffusion and its contribution to cyber security. The
EU DBNO can have an expressive function in the fact that data
breach disclosure can help others and contribute to overall
cyber security. Apart from the directly beneficial digital first
aid kit, discussed in the previous paragraph, the DPA could
share certain information and the best practices of cyber risk
management pro-actively. For instance, the DPA could build
(anonymized) metrics about data breaches.103 
6.5. Summary 
Table 4 below displays the various incentive schemes to in-
duce data controllers to notify, and their public costs. 03 Building metrics about cyber data is one of the key challenges 
in cyber security economics, see for instance Hadi Asghari, Michel 
van Eeten and Milton Mueller, ‘Internet Measurements and Public 
Policy: Mind the Gap’ (2013) paper presented at The sixth USENIX 
Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 12 Aug. 2013, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/ 
conference/cset13/cset13-asghari.pdf accessed 16 May 2018. 
1244 computer law & security review 34 (2018) 1232–1246 
Table 4 – Incentive schemes and their social costs. 
Social costs Incentive scheme Marginal social 
costs relative to a 
decreasing 
notification 
threshold 
Almost no social 
costs 
Threat of administrative 
fine of €10,000,000 or 2% 
of the undertakings 
turnover 
Stable 
Expressive function of 
the regulation 
Decreasing 
Low social costs Violation specific 
enforcement 
Stable 
Medium social costs 
but compensated by 
social benefits 
Digital first aid kit Decreasing 
Medium social costs 
(depends on 
intensity) 
(Limited) Ex ante risk 
based auditing 
Stable 
High social costs General enforcement Stable 
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107 And it has the power to do so ex GDPR, Art. 34(4). 
108 See supra Section 2 . 
109 See supra Section 4.2 . . Which disclosure threshold design of the 
U DBNO will contribute to social welfare? 
ection 6 discussed whether the EU DBNO sufficiently induces 
ata controllers to comply with the regulation. If we suppose 
hat a smart mix of incentives can indeed sufficiently induce 
ufficient data controllers to comply with the regulation, then 
he disclosure threshold determines the social benefits (or 
hen set wrongly, the social costs) of the EU DBNO.104 This 
ection discusses the disclosure threshold for DPAs and data 
ubjects. 
.1. The disclosure threshold for notification to DPAs 
he GDPR defines the threshold for notifying to the DPA as 
hose data breaches that result in a ‘risk to the rights and 
reedoms of natural persons’.105 How should this threshold be 
nterpreted? In addition, should there be a difference in no- 
ifying to the DPA and data subjects? To begin with the last 
uestion: the difference between threshold notification to the 
PA and data subjects can be explained quite easily because 
he total social costs of the former are only a fraction of the 
osts of notification to the latter. The organization that noti- 
es has limited costs in providing the DPA with the necessary 
nformation (compared with communicating to an often large 
roup of data subjects) and the DPA has limited costs in pro- 
essing the information.106 Moreover, it can already provide 
he organization with its ‘digital first aid kit’, which generates 
ocial benefits. Social costs such as the administrative costs 
f the data subject and notification fatigue do not manifest 04 See supra Section 2 . 
05 GDPR, Art. 33. 
06 See supra Section 5.2 . 
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hemselves when only the DPA has to be notified. Hence, the 
hreshold for notification to the DPA should be low, especially 
ecause the DPA itself might be better able to judge whether 
n additional notification to data subjects is necessary from a 
ocial welfare perspective.107 
.2. The disclosure threshold for notification to data 
ubjects 
n the case of notification to affected data subjects, the GDPR 
aises the threshold in Article 34 by adding that in this case 
he risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons should 
e ‘high’ (Article 34).108 This incremental threshold can be ex- 
lained, because the social costs of notification to data sub- 
ects are much higher. First, data breach disclosure to data 
ubjects in general results in a larger net private loss because 
f reputation damage, higher administrative costs of disclo- 
ure (compared to notifying solely to the DPA) and the po- 
ential liability costs.109 Second, there are also significant so- 
ial costs of data breach disclosure, such as the administrative 
osts of processing the notification by affected data subjects 
nd notification fatigue.110 On the other hand, notification to 
ata subjects generates most of the ‘right to know’ and infor- 
ation diffusion social benefits.111 The DPA should special- 
ze in estimating in which situations costs outweigh benefits 
nd give clear guidelines and examples of when the data con- 
roller should notify and when not. A higher threshold for no- 
ification to data subjects in combination with a relatively low 
hreshold for notification to DPAs is preferable. In a case where 
he data controller wrongly interprets that, it should not notify 
ata subjects according to the high threshold, Article 34(4) al- 
ows the DPA to require that the organization notify data sub- 
ects anyway. This reduces the likelihood that data breaches 
re disclosed that are not socially beneficial and corrects this 
nder-estimation. 
.3. Smart thresholds 
nder the current regime, there are two actors that can 
ecide whether to notify data breaches to the public: the 
ata controller itself ex Article 34 GDPR and the Data Pro- 
ection Authorities (DPAs) ex Article 34(4) GDPR. The analy- 
is above describes the optimal disclosure threshold within 
he scope of the regulation for both actors. When we al- 
ow ourselves to think slightly beyond the current Articles 33 
nd 34 of the GDPR, other solutions emerge for a ‘smarter’ 
hreshold. 
There are strong arguments for an intensified role of the 
PA in the notification procedure. This is related to the fact 
hat DPAs can build up expertise in determining the thresh- 
ld, being a repeat player, in contrast to individual data con- 10 See supra Section 3.3 . 
11 Op. cit. De Hert and Papakonstantinou (n 13), 192: compared 
o earlier versions of the GDPR, the notification requirement for 
onsumers is a ‘notch’ higher, as former versions did not include 
he requirement that the risk should be high. 
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trollers who are unlikely to be involved more than once.112 The
approach followed in the GDPR to rely primarily on disclosure
to the DPA, can therefore be understood precisely since the po-
tentially averse consequences of notification (notification fa-
tigue and reputational damage) will arise especially in case of
notification to data subjects. One could even raise the question
whether a notification to data subjects does have a benefit.
Does a system of a notification to the DPA not suffice whereby
the DPA, according to Article 34(4) GDPR, decides whether in-
formation to the public is necessary? In most cases it probably
does. However, there may be situations of data breaches where
a mere notification to the DPA may not suffice, for example,
because potentially higher damage could result to data sub-
jects if no immediate action is taken. The notification to the
DPA could then slow down further action, especially because
it is not known whether the DPA will indeed inform the pub-
lic. Therefore, although notification to the DPA has priority, for
cases where the data breach could result in high risks, it is still
important to impose a subsequent duty to notify data subjects
as well. 
A more intensified role for the DPA also complements the
discussion on the ‘digital first aid kit’ in Section 6.3 . When
DPAs develop expertise to assist data controllers on mitigat-
ing damage, it can reasonably be assumed that they also are
in a better position to determine whether notification to data
subjects increases social welfare. The question is thus which
decision-making model should form the basis for the DPA
to decide whether notifications that they have received from
data controllers should also reach the public, given the social
cost and benefits of such a notification. The following three ar-
eas of expertise are of relevance. The DPA should first be able
to distinguish whether there is direct action needed by the
data subjects. When direct action is needed, the data breach
notification should be notified in any case, to the extent that
the benefits of these actions exceed the administrative costs
on the side of the data subject. Second, the DPA should be
able to qualify the impact of the data breach on the rights
and freedoms of data subjects, for instance, by breaking down
data breaches in low, medium and high impact breaches. A
third area of expertise concerns the estimation of notifica-
tion fatigue and especially the level in which it becomes prob-
lematic. Concerning notification fatigue, it could be desirable
to make the notification decision contingent upon the previ-
ous amounts of notifications to a data subject. Here the DPA
can utilize the stream of academic literature from behavioural
economics. 
8. Concluding remarks 
From May 25, 2018 onwards, the European Union finally has a
general data breach notification obligation (EU DBNO) as part
of the General Data Protection Regulation. We conclude that
most data controllers will not spontaneously disclose in the
absence of a regulation. The simple reason is that the private12 Marc Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Specula- 
tions on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law and Society 95, 
97. 
 
 
costs of notification are higher than the social benefits. This
indeed necessitates regulation from a social welfare perspec-
tive, provided only data breaches that surpass a threshold are
disclosed to the public. We conclude that the two main chal-
lenges of the EU are to induce data controllers to notify and to
set the notification threshold at a socially acceptable level. Re-
garding the former, we argue that solely relying on deterrence
will potentially be very costly or result in a limited likelihood
of detection, even if ex ante risk-based auditing or ex post vi-
olation specific enforcement are taken into account. It is hard
to predict the effects of the high administrative fine provided
for in the GDPR. It could either lead to under-deterrence, given
the low probability of detection, or to over-deterrence lead-
ing to too many notifications and thus to notification fatigue.
The precise direction may depend upon the risk attitude of
the data controllers and on their (subjective) assessment of
the probability of detection. However, both risks point to the
limitations of a deterrence approach. 
We encourage the DPA to study rewarding compliance and
the expressive function of the regulation, as alternative in-
centive schemes. Especially, the digital first aid kit can be a
promising additional incentive for data controllers to com-
ply, provided that DPAs develop themselves as a centre of
expertise in mitigating data breaches. Regarding the latter
(the optimal level of the threshold) our analysis clarified that
data breach disclosure can be a costly exercise from a so-
cial welfare perspective. Notification fatigue and the admin-
istrative costs of affected data subjects in particular negate
social benefits when large amounts of insignificant data
breaches are being disclosed to the public. Hence, the thresh-
old for notifying to data subjects needs to be fairly high and
clear-cut. The threshold for notifying the DPA can be much
lower. 
Unfortunately, there is little empirical research in this area.
There are some data on data breaches, but for example, lit-
tle is known about the effects of other obligations to dis-
close breaches of personal data. The entire EU DBNO is, there-
fore, largely based on assumptions about how data controllers
will react to the DBNO, given the particular sanction regime.
We have already indicated that, even theoretically, it is dif-
ficult to predict the effects of the regime, as it strongly de-
pends on specific assumptions. Those may be crucial to de-
termine the effectiveness of the DBNO. Once the DBNO has
been put in place (in May 2018), it will be interesting to exam-
ine its effects based on empirical studies. Thus far, the predic-
tions as to the effects of the DBNO remain largely based on
theory. 
The EU DBNO can be a welfare-enhancing piece of legisla-
tion, provided that it is wisely enforced and executed by na-
tional DPAs. Naturally, the social effects of the DBNO depend
upon the actions taken by the DPAs after they have received
the information on data breaches. Ultimately, if notifications
merely end up in a digital drawer at the DPA and no further ac-
tion is taken to promote data security, then obviously the en-
tire DBNO would become an extremely costly exercise, with-
out any social benefits as far as improving cyber security is
concerned. This points to the crucial role to be played by the
national DPAs in making the EU DBNO a success. 
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